Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 43
Issue 4 October 2010

Article 4

2010

Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims?
Caroline C. Rudaz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
Caroline C. Rudaz, Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims?, 43 Vanderbilt Law Review 1077
(2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol43/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Did Trinko Really Kill Antitrust
Price Squeeze Claims? A Critical
Approach to the Linkline Decision
Through a Comparison of E.U. and
U.S. Case Law
Caroline CavaleriRudaz*
ABSTRACT

This Article presents a critical analysis of the Linkline case
that refuses to recognize price squeeze claims as antitrustclaims
under § 2 of the Sherman Act. It argues that Linkline gives a
distorted reading of Trinko without giving proper attention to
the applicationof § 2 of the ShermanAct. The Linkline decision
takes a dogmatic position and thus, while refuting the Alcoa
decision, appears to be a missed opportunity to more precisely
define price squeezing.
This Article offers a comparison between the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision and the recent European decisions delivered in
broadband access cases that are pointing in a completely
different direction. As U.S. antitrust law and E. U. competition
law converge by seeking to protect consumer welfare through the
application of law based on sound economic analysis, price
squeezing illustrates the most acute difference between the U.S
and E. U.: the fear of introducing regulatory principles through
antitrust law in the U.S. as opposed to a more tolerant
perception of state intervention in the E. U.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In AT&T California v. Linkline Communications, Inc., a
February 2009 case related to broadband access in the
telecommunications sector, the U.S. Supreme Court curbed the
development of price squeeze' claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act by

1.
A price squeeze or margin squeeze occurs ifa vertically integrated firm sets
a too-high wholesale price, a too-low retail price, or a combination of both, creating an
insufficient or negative spread between wholesale and retail prices. See 3A PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW I 767c5, at 141-42 (3d ed. 2008)
(defining "predatory price squeeze" and describing the situations in which it should be
illegal); PAUL NIHOUL & PETER RODFORD, E.U. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION LAW:
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refusing to recognize them as antitrust claims. 2 Shortly before
Linkline, the European Commission3 and the European Union's
Court of First Instance 4 also each delivered a decision in a broadband
access case. Their decisions pointed in a totally different direction
than Linkline: the European decisions condemned price squeezing as
an abuse of a dominant market position.5
Linkline reaffirms the Supreme Court's concerns-previously
expressed in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko6-over protecting the incentive to invest and innovate, saving
antitrust courts from acting as central planners,7 and, ultimately,
avoiding error costs.8 Although Linkline relies heavily on Trinko, it
distorts this precedent and fails to properly consider the application
of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Rather than truly examining the issue of
monopolization, the decision takes a dogmatic position. Linkline
refutes Alcoa but misses an opportunity to more precisely define price
squeezing; leaves certain questions unresolved; and draws a
confusing connection between a price squeeze and the duty to deal,
subordinating the first to the second.
This Article compares Linkline with recent European decisions,
specifically Commissioner v. Deutsche Telekom AG and Wanadoo
Espara v. Telef6nica. It examines how courts on both sides of the
Atlantic resolve questions surrounding price squeezing in antitrust
cases. The cases analyzed in this Article are emblematic of the
current development of antitrust law in the United States and in the
European Union, and the outcomes of these cases show the
differences in the treatment of similar claims within the same sector.

COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET
§ 4.219, at 427 (2004) (defining "price squeeze" and proceeding to list examples and
strategies); Damien Geradin & Robert O'Donoghue, The Concurrent Application of

Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the
Telecommunications Sectors, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & EcON. 355, 357 (2005). This
definition is further discussed infra Part III.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1123 (2009).
2.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
3.
78
4/
Espafia v. Telef6nica, http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/antitrust/cases/decisions/38
Commission's
dec en.pdf [hereinafter Telef6nica]. For a summary of the European
decision, see Summary of Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, 2008 O.J. (C 83) 6
[hereinafter Telef6nica Summary].
See Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. 11-477,
4.
5 C.L.M.R. 9 (2008).
5. See id.; Telefdnica, Case COMP/38.784, paras. 686-94.
540 U.S. 398 (2004). Customers complained that Verizon Communications
6.
Inc., the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC), was filling competitors' orders after
those for its own service, failing to fill competitors orders in a timely manner in order
to limit entry. Id. at 403-04. The Court concluded that Verizon had no antitrust duty to
deal and therefore, no antitrust duty to provide sufficient assistance in the provision of
service to rivals. Id. at 411.
Id. at 407-08.
7.
Id. at 414.
8.
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Ultimately, this Article refutes the notion that diverging competition
goals, an explanation for the divergence commonly propounded in the
United States, can fully explain the differences between the U.S. and
E.U. cases, because both U.S. and E.U. competition laws aim to
protect consumer welfare.
The observations set forth in this Article address the
telecommunications sector. All of the cases involve a vertically
integrated, formerly monopolistic firm that still holds a dominant
position on an input characterized by significant sunk costs in a
telephone network extending to a local loop.
This asset is
uneconomical to duplicate. As a result, in each case, access to the
integrated firm's network was opened to competitors through
regulation to develop a competitive downstream market of DSL
services. Each vertically integrated firm sells wholesale inputs and
finished goods or services at the retail level, and new entrants are
both customers (at the wholesale level) and competitors (at the retail
level) of these integrated firms.
Part II of the Article briefly outlines three decisions: Linkline,
Deutsche Telekom AG, and Telef6nica. Part III defines a price
squeeze claim by first looking at its historical development in the
United States and European Union and then discussing several
controversial aspects: the delineation of the market definition and the
market power of a price squeeze; the values and economical
references to consider when defining its abuse; and the legitimate
business reasons that can justify the dominant firm's behavior. The
Article then shifts to three questions intrinsically linked to price
squeeze claims. Part IV examines whether a price squeeze implies a
duty to deal. Part V examines the relationship between regulation
and antitrust in the framework of a price squeeze. Finally, Part VI
examines what antitrust goals are targeted from the perspective of a
price squeeze claim. This Article concludes with the assertion that
U.S. and E.U. laws both theoretically aspire to protect consumer
welfare, but differing approaches to competition law bring about
opposing results in price squeeze cases.
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II. RECENT DECISIONS
A. Linkline
As a former monopolist, AT&T9 controls most of the local
telephone network and, in particular, the last mile, which connects
the subscriber, private homes or businesses, and the local network
exchange.1 0 As a vertically integrated firm, AT&T sells both
wholesale DSL access to Internet service providers (ISPs) and-in
competition with these same ISPs-finished goods and services to
individual consumers at the retail level." Until 2005, AT&T was
required by the regulatory authority to open its local loop to
competitors in order to develop a competitive market for Internet
services.12 This forced-sharing requirement was then abandoned
because of competition beyond DSL for high-speed Internet services,
but AT&T remains bound "to provide wholesale 'DSL transport'
service to independent firms at a price no greater than the retail price
of AT&T's DSL service" as a condition of a recent merger.13
The plaintiffs in Linkline were four independent ISPs
(hereinafter Linkline) that offer high-speed digital data transmission
via telephone cable.14 To provide their services to consumers, they
needed access to the network elements provided by AT&T.15 In their
claims against AT&T, the plaintiffs alleged that their profit margins
were being illegally squeezed because AT&T had sufficient market
power to simultaneously raise prices in the wholesale market and cut
the retail price of the finished goods, thus monopolizing or attempting
to monopolize regional digital subscriber-line markets.16
While the case was pending at the district court, the Supreme
Court issued the Trinko decision, holding that "a firm with no
antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at all is under no obligation to
provide those rivals with a 'sufficient' level of service."' 7 AT&T then

9.
Petitioners are actually several corporate entities and subsidiaries referred
to as AT&T. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comme'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115 n.1
(2009).
10.
Id. at 1115.
Id.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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argued that Trinko foreclosed the plaintiffs' claim.' 8 The district
court denied both parties' motions for judgment on the pleadings.' 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Linkline stat3d a claim
under price squeeze theory and granted certiorari. First, the court
observed that price squeeze allegations had long been recognized as
valid claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act, and a price squeeze could
occur even if prices were regulated at both wholesale and retail
levels. 20 Next, the court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision
in Trinko2 ' did not call for a reconsideration of this view.22 Trinko
explains that "claims that satisfy established antitrust standards" are
preserved in particular regulatory contexts.23 Trinko did not involve
a price squeeze theory, and the Ninth Circuit concluded that a price
squeeze claim remained a potentially viable antitrust claim. 24
Furthermore, the court concluded that Trinko did not bar the
application of antitrust law in regulated industries, but a regulatory
regime is "one factor" for a court to consider when determining
antitrust liability.2 5 In the case at hand, only wholesale prices were
regulated and retail prices were constrained by antitrust law. 26 The
court thus held that, if Linkline could prove that its allegation
involved only unregulated prices, it could bring a valid antitrust
claim.2 7
AT&T appealed to the Supreme Court.28 The Supreme Court
heard the case and disagreed with the Ninth Circuit. It concluded
that the Sherman Act did not recognize a price squeeze claim. 29
The Court's argument is seductive in its simplicity: following
Trinko, if an undertaking "has no antitrust duty to deal with
competitors at wholesale, it certainly has no duty to deal under terms
and conditions that the rivals find commercially advantageous."3 0
Thus, the Supreme Court found no reason to distinguish between
price and nonprice components of a transaction for antitrust

Id. at 1115-16.
18.
Linkline Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC California, Inc., 305 F.3d 876, 877 (9th.
19.
Cir. 2007), vacated, 563 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2009).
Linkline, 305 F.3d at 880.
20.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
21.
398 (2004).
Linkline, 305 F.3d at 883.
22.

23.

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 406.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Linkline, 305 F.3d at 883.
Id.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
Id. at 1116-17.
Id. at 1119.
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purposes, and it held that AT&T was not required to propose
wholesale prices at the level its rivals would have preferred. 3 '
With this argument, Linkline rules out all antitrust claims
regarding price in the upstream market,3 2 and leaves valid only
claims concerning overly low prices in the downstream market. 33 To
prevail in this type of claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate two
conditions: 34 first, that "the prices complained of are below an
appropriate measure of its rival's costs" and, second, that "there is a
'dangerous probability' that the defendant will be able to recoup its
'investment' in below-cost prices."3 5 But "there [was] no allegation
that AT&T's conduct met either of the Brooke Group requirements." 36
In its decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the needarticulated in Trinko-for clear antitrust rules and emphasized the
difficulty antitrust courts face when attempting to administer prices
directly.37 In the Court's view, "[r]ecognizing price-squeeze claims
would require courts simultaneously to police both the wholesale and
retail prices to ensure that rival firms are not being squeezed. And
courts would be aiming at a moving target, since it is the interaction
between these two prices that may result in a squeeze."38 The Court
rejected a transfer price test to evaluate a price squeeze because a
transfer price test lacked any grounding in antitrust jurisprudence.3 9
The Court thus reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 40
B. Deutsche Telekom AG
Deutsche Telekom AG is the former telecommunications
monopolist in Germany operating the country's fixed telephone
The company offers competing telecommunications
network. 4 '
operators and customers regulated access to a local loop. 42 The
German regulatory authority partially regulates and controls access

31.
Id.
Id. ("[Sluch claims are not cognizable under the Sherman Act in the
32.
absence of an antitrust duty to deal.").
Id. ("To avoid chilling aggressive price competition, we have carefully
33.
limited the circumstances under which plaintiffs can state a Sherman Act claim by
alleging that prices are too low.").
Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222
34.
(1993).
Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1120 (citing Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222-24).
35.
36.
Id.
Id.
37.
Id. at 1121.
38.
Id. at 1121-22.
39.
Id. at 1123.
40.
41.
Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578,
37.57-Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, para. 6.
42.
Id. para. 12.
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price, but Deutsche Telekom still makes commercially independent
decisions. 43 A commercial undertaking subject to price regulation
must be able to avoid or suppress a price squeeze for competition laws
to apply. 44 Indeed, the Court of Justice of the European Communities
and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities "have
consistently held that the competition rules may apply where the
sector-specific legislation does not preclude the undertakings it
governs from engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents,
restricts
or
distorts
competition." 45
Furthermore,
the
telecommunications sector in Germany is subject to competition rules
under the European Communities' Commission Notice on the
Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the
Telecommunications Sector.46 Deutsche Telekom potentially violated
the competition rules, and the Commission had a duty to
investigate.4 7
The European Commission (whose decision was confirmed by the
Court of First Instance 48) found that Deutsche Telekom held a
dominant position in the relevant markets-wholesale access services
for competitors, plus retail broadband and narrowband for individual
and access customers. 49 The Commission then examined the price
squeeze claim50 and stated that a price squeeze claim must show a
disproportion between wholesale and retail prices that restricts
competition in one of those markets.5 i The Commission found that
there is a margin squeeze "if the difference between the retail prices
charged by a dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it
charges its competitors for comparable services is negative, or
insufficient to cover the product-specific costs to the dominant
operator of providing its own retail services on the downstream
market."5 2 A negative or excessively narrow margin may exclude
competitors from the downstream market, even if they are as efficient
as the established operator.5 3 This means that the retail price does
not need to be set below costs. Instead, the spread between wholesale

43.
See id. para. 36.
44.
Id. para. 105.
45.
Id. para. 54.
46.
See Commission Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to
Access Agreements in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (C 265) 2 [hereinafter
Access Notice].
47.
Deutsche Telekom AG, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578, 37.57, para. 54.
48.
Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. 11-477, 5
C.L.M.R. 9 (2008).
49.
Deutsche Telekom AG, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578, 37.57, para. 58.
Id. para. 102.
50.
Id. para. 105.
51.
Id. para. 107.
52.
53.
Id. para. 108.
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and retail prices creates unfairness in the form of an abusive margin
squeeze. If wholesale market prices are higher than retail prices, a
negative spread constitutes a squeeze irrespective of the specific
costs.54 When wholesale prices are lower than retail prices, the
margin is positive, but there still is a squeeze if the spread would not
enable the incumbent to cover its product-specific costs of providing
55
its services to customers.

The Court of First Instance agreed that a dominant company's
own charges and costs should be the reference to determine whether
there is abusive behavior, taking the general principle of legal
Thus, the operator can assess the
certainty into account. 56
lawfulness of its behavior. 5 7 The Court found that Deutsche
Telekom's abusive behavior raised such high barriers that no
discernible improvement in competition could be seen in more than
two years in the relevant markets.5 8 At the time of writing, the case
is pending on appeal to the Court of Justice.5 9
C. Telef6nica
Telef6nica is the former monopolist in Spain, with a nationwide
telecommunications network. 60 ADSL, the main technology in Spain,
provides broadband to consumers, and Telef6nica controls the entire
value chain. 61 Duplication of Telef6nica's local network would be
uneconomical, 62 and companies have not successfully breached the
Therefore, alternative
market with alternative technologies. 63
providers have had to contract wholesale access products built on
Telef6nica's local access network.64 Telef6nica dominates Spain's
three relevant markets: the retail broadband "mass" market, and the
wholesale broadband access markets at regional and national
levels. 65
The European Commission determined that Telef6nica abused
its dominant position in the form of a price squeeze created by a

54.

Id. para. 138.

55.

Id.

56.

Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, 5

C.L.M.R. 9, para. 2 (2008).
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Deutsche Telekom AG, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578, 37.57, para. 181.
See Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 O.J. (C 223)

31.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case
60.
Espaaia v. Telef6nica, para. 13.
Id. para. 82.
61.
Id. para. 167.
62.
63.
Id. para. 276.
Id. para. 74.
64.
See id. paras. 161, 208.
65.

COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
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disproportion between its wholesale and retail prices, and this price
squeeze could restrict competition in the retail market. 66
Telef6nica argued that the price squeeze under investigation
amounted to a refusal to supply and, therefore, the conditions
previously established by the European Court of Justice in relation to
the essential facilities doctrine 67 must be fulfilled for the company to
violate the antitrust rules. 68 In that respect, Telef6nica argued that
its upstream product must be proven indispensable to the
downstream product before a price squeeze claim could be brought. 69
The European Commission disagreed.70 It found that Telef6nica
had a regulatory duty, proceeding from a balancing of interests, to
supply wholesale services to promote downstream competition. The
need to promote competition through the regulatory access exceeded
the need to preserve Telef6nica's ex ante incentive to invest and
exploit the upstream infrastructure for its own benefit. 7 '
Furthermore, Telef6nica's incentive to invest was not at stake
because all of the investment in the network was made while the
company was protected from competition by special or exclusive
rights. Moreover, the investments in the network were made well
before the advent of ADSL technology, and the company could not
have considered mandatory access at that time.7 2
Telef6nica
supported the cost of enabling the network element to support
broadband traffic, but it did not have to establish a specific transport
network.7 3 Finally, Telef6nica could have ended its abusive behavior,
but the operator did not propose lower wholesale prices, even though
prices were unregulated or regulated in the form of maximum
prices. 74
As a result, the European Commission found that Telef6nica's
behavior impaired the competition process and affected the
competitors' ability to enter the market and exert a competitive
pressure on Telef6nica:
The margin squeeze restricted competition by imposing unsustainable
losses on equally efficient competitors: they were either ultimately
forced to exit or in any event constrained in their ability to invest and
to grow. Even if they met Telef6nica both on prices and marketing
expenditure, they were poorly placed in the long run to offer a vigorous

66.
Id. para. 285.
67.
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-und
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791, para. 24.
68.
Telef6nica, Case COMP/38.784, para. 299.
69.
Id. para. 300.
70.
Id. para. 302.
71.
Id. para. 303.
72.
Id. paras. 303-08.
73.
Id. para. 305.
74.
Id. para. 675.
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competitive challenge to Telef6nica as a result of their continuing
losses. As a result, Telef6nica's conduct was likely to delay the entry
and growth of competitors. Therefore, Telef6nica's conduct was likely
to delay as long as possible the arrival of ADSL operators at a level of
economies of scale which would have justified investments in their own
75
infrastructure and, ultimately, the use of local loop unbundling.

Telef6nica's conduct resulted in actual harm to consumers
because they would have benefitted from more aggressive competition
in the form of lower prices and increased choice and innovation. The
detrimental impact of Telef6nica's conduct on end users could be
measured: retail prices in Spain were among the highest in the
European Community, and ADSL penetration was below the E.C.
average without any demand or supply factors that explained the
results. 76 At the time of writing, the case has been appealed to the
Court of First Instance.77
III. PRICE SQUEEZE DEFINITION

To understand the origins of such diverging decisions and what
underlies a price squeeze on each side of the Atlantic, this Part
defines a price squeeze based on its historic developments. It
compares the conditions that constitute monopolization or an attempt
to monopolize on the one hand, with conditions that constitute an
abuse of a dominant position on the other hand. It discusses how the
market is framed and how market power is established. It compares
the values and figures that the courts in the above decisions took into
account to determine whether prices were squeezed. It finally
examines which possible justifications for a price squeeze may arise.
A. PriceSqueeze Foundations in the United States
and European Union
1.

United States

In the United States, the price squeeze question is based on § 2
of the Sherman Act and first appeared in Alcoa.78 Alcoa sold
aluminum ingots to its competitors on the upstream market and
aluminum sheets on the downstream market.7 9 Judge Hand found

75.
76.

Telefdnica Summary, supranote 3, at 8.
See Telef6nica, Case COMP/38.784, para. 544.

77.
Case T-336/07, Telef6nica v. Comm'n, 2007 O.J. (C 269) 55.
78.
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Aloca), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (describing the plaintiffs price squeeze theory and analyzing whether it amounts
to a monopoly under §2 of the Sherman Act); Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2006).
79.
Id. at 422.
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that Alcoa used its monopoly power to hold the price of ingots at a
high level.80 As a result, the cost of the aluminum ingot plus the cost
of transforming the ingot into sheet for Alcoa's competitors was
greater than the price at which Alcoa itself sold sheet. Consequently,
competitors could not make a "living profit."81 To come to this
conclusion, Judge Hand considered Alcoa's own cost of rolling the
sheet as a fair measure of its competitors' costs and assumed, in the
absence of the proof to the contrary, that it was a reasonable
supposition that Alcoa's rolling costs were not higher than those of its
competitors. 82 Judge Hand then assumed that competitors needed to
meet Alcoa's prices because of these costs. But competitors were
unable to compete on the downstream market and were put out of
business because the spread between the cost of ingot and the cost of
rolling was insignificant or negative.8 3
Among other considerations, Judge Hand concluded that "it was
unlawful to set the price of 'sheet' so low and hold the price of ingot so
high ... provided .. . that on [the] record the price of ingot must be
regarded as higher than a 'fair price.' 84
Judge Hand based the decision on Alcoa's own costs and the
spread between its wholesale and retail prices, but the decision
provides no precise guidance as to what should be considered a "fair
price" for wholesale goods or a "living profit" on the retail market.85
The "Hand decision has been cited and discussed approvingly in
many subsequent cases before the Supreme Court."86 It is influential
in electricity and telecommunications sector cases, although the price
Nevertheless, these
squeeze does not figure in any statute.8 7
Alcoa clarified the
decisions leave the offense undefined.88
relationship between antitrust and regulation: the Federal Power
Commission (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) has to
consider unregulated retail prices when setting wholesale rates to

Id. at 445.
80.
Id. at 437.
81.
Id.
82.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 438.
See id. (failing to define "fair price" or "living profit"); see also Town of
85.
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting the difficulty of
administering Judge Hand's price squeeze test).
Paul A. Grout, Defining Price Squeeze in Competition Law, in THE PROS
86.
AND CONS OF LOW PRICES 71, 73 (2003).
Id. at 74; see Paul L. Joskow, Mixing Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in
87.
the Electric Power Industry: The Price Squeeze and Retail Market Competition, in
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. McGOWAN 173, 185
(Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985).
See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976)
88.
(failing to define "price squeeze"); City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 616
F.2d. 976, 983-85 (7th Cir. 1980) (same).
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avoid price squeeze. 89 Furthermore, public utilities' wholesale rates
are not immune to the Sherman Act because public utilities can use
administrative processes and threaten competitors.9 0
In another major decision addressing price squeeze, Town of
Concord v. Boston Edison Co., the First Circuit dissolved the
relationship between wholesale and retail prices and split the
definition of price squeeze into a too-high upstream price or a too-low
downstream price.9 1 Moreover, the Chicago School of economics
influenced the court's rejection of the price squeeze theory. 92 First,
the court found that the extension of monopoly power from the
upstream market to the downstream market provides no incentive to
exclude a rival because a firm does not gain added power to raise
prices. 93 Second, the court found that if the primary-level monopolist
carries out its second-level activities more efficiently than its
competitors, price squeezing brings economics benefits. 94 Third, the
court found that if the second-level firm is itself a monopolist, a price
squeeze will benefit consumers. 9 5 Finally, the court found that, when
both upstream and downstream markets are regulated, regulators
are better equipped to assess whether prices reflect costs and thus to
prevent the need to apply competition law. 96

89.
See Conway Corp., 426 U.S. at 280-82 (discussing Federal Power
Commission rate-setting requirements, but not specifically referencing the Alcoa case).
90.
City of Mishawaka, 616 F.2d. at 983-84.
91.
Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[A]
price squeeze occurs when the integrated firm's price at the first level is too high, or its
price at the second level is too low, for the independent to cover its costs and stay in
business.").
92.
Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and
Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the
Internet Age (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Dept' of Econ., Working Paper No. E02-325,
2003), available athttp://escholarship.org/uclitem/4dh7q2dd;jsessionid=8A87B66F86C6
97Al36D77CC167092C56 ("By the late 1970s, however, the Chicago School of
economics had taught mainstream antitrust thinking that vertical integration (e.g.,
merger) and many kinds of vertical contract had efficiency benefits and were unlikely
to harm competition."); see generally ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KovAcIc &
STEVEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 137 (5th ed. 2004)
(stating that "[w]here entry is easy, courts have declined to infer monopoly power even
from high market shares because actual or threatened entry will drive prices to
competitive levels.").
93.
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 23 (stating that "the extension of monopoly
power from one to two levels does not necessarily, nor in an obvious way, give a firm
added power to raise prices'); see also Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and
the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARv. L. REV. 397 (2009)
(discussing the single monopoly profit theory).
94.
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 24.
95.
Id.
96.
See id. at 25-26 (noting that regulators try to set prices that reflect costs);
cf. City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 616 F.2d. 976, 983-84 (7th Cir.
1980) (discussing a dual federal and state regulatory scheme).

1090

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 43:1077

In Linkline, Chief Justice Roberts based his opinion on antitrust
law, mainly relying on the Trinko case, rather than economic
grounds, like in Town of Concord.97 He considered the price squeeze
claim to be a new form of antitrust liability, which he saw no need to
recognize.9 8 Following the First Circuit's reasoning in Town of
Concord, he divided the case into two claims: an antitrust duty to
deal claim in the upstream market and a predatory pricing claim in
the downstream market. 99 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that
when there is no duty to deal on the upstream market, wholesale
pricing conditions cannot be considered and the plaintiff is left to
prove predatory pricing.10 0
2.

European Union

In the European Union, Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which entered into force
December 1, 2009, prohibits abuse of a dominant position and, in
particular, unfair selling prices, including excessive pricing.10 1 But
Article 102 does not exhaustively list the ways in which a dominant
position may be abused. 102
Price squeeze was first outlined in a 1975 European Commission
decision 0 3 and further developed in Napier Brown v. British
Sugar.104 In the latter, a company dominated the sugar markets for
both raw material and derived products. 10 5 The Commission found
that the spread between the price charged for raw material and the
price charged for its derived products was insufficient to reflect the
company's cost of transformation.106 This circumstance restricted
competition in the derived products markets, and the Commission

97.
See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1118-20
(2009) (relying primarily upon legal analysis of the Trinko decision to find that an
alleged price squeeze did not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act when
petitioners had no antitrust duty to deal with respondents in the wholesale market).
98.
Id. at 1123.
99.
Id. at 1119-20, 1123.
100.
Id. at 1119-20.
101.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 102, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 89 [hereinafter TFEU].
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
102.
Espafla v. Telef6nica, para. 280.
103
Commission Decision of 29 October 1975, National Carbonizing Company
Limited, 1976 O.J. (L 35) 6.
104.
See Commission Decision of 18 July 1988, Case IV/30.178-Napier
Brown/British Sugar, 1988 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0518 [hereinafter Napier Brown].
105.
Id. para. 66.
106.
Id.
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concluded that the company's behavior constituted abuse of a
dominant position. 0 7
In a 2000 decision, Industrie des Poudres Sphdriques, the
European Commission specified that applicants must demonstrate
either abusive pricing in the upstream market or predatory pricing in
the retail market, or that the price is aimed to exclude an equally
efficient competitor because of an insufficient margin. 0 8 If pricing is
not exclusionary, there is no need to look at the profit margin on the
wholesale market. 0 9 Under these circumstances, if customers of the
applicant will not pay a higher price, that demonstrates either that
the price is too high, meaning that the competitor is not efficient
enough, or that the proposed product is of better quality and the
competitor is at least equally efficient, but there is no demand for this
offer on the downstream market, which, of course, is not protected by
competition law.110
The European Communities' Commission Notice on the
Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in the
Telecommunications Sector defines a price squeeze as an abuse of a
dominant position. It also clarifies the conditions of a price squeeze,
the basis of which is established in case law."' According to the
notice, one of two alternative conditions must be fulfilled to
demonstrate a price squeeze. First, "the dominant company's own
downstream operations could not trade profitably on the basis of the
upstream prices charged to its competitors .... ."112 Alternatively,
"[iun appropriate circumstances ... the margin between the price
charged to competitors on the downstream market .. . for access and

the price which the network operator charges in the downstream
market is insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service provider
... to obtain a normal profit" in the downstream market. In this

case, though, the network operator can justify the insufficient margin
by showing that its own downstream operation is exceptionally
efficient.' 1 3
The notice concludes by stating that if the first condition can be
demonstrated, the "competitors on the downstream market would be

Id.
107.
Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres Sphdriques v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. II108.
3755, paras. 177-85. Telefdnica confirms that there is no need to demonstrate that
either the wholesale price is excessive in itself or that the retail price is predatory in
itself. Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo Espafia v.
Telef6nica, para. 283.
109.
Industriedes Poudres Sphdriques, 2000 E.C.R. II-3755, para. 183.
Id. para. 185.
110.
111.
Access Notice, supranote 46, paras. 117-19.
Id. para. 117.
112.
Id. para. 118.
113.
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faced with a price squeeze which could force them out of the
market." 114
The Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct
by Dominant Undertakings,1 1 5 released in the framework of the
Article 82 review, addresses the subject of a price squeeze as a refusal
to supply.116 Indeed, instead of refusing access, "a dominant
undertaking may charge a price for the product on the upstream
market which, compared to the price it charges on the downstream
market, does not allow even an equally efficient competitor to trade
profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis."" 7 The
European Commission generally relies on the long-run average
incremental cost (LRAIC)118 on the downstream division of the
integrated dominant undertaking as a benchmark to determine the
costs of an equally efficient competitor.1 9
The comparison of the very foundation of price squeeze in the
United States and the European Union shows that E.U. case law
stays very close to the principles established by Judge Hand in Alcoa,
where the "fair price" is to be determined by the LRAIC. 2 0
Furthermore, while U.S. case law rejects price squeeze claims as a
ground for liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act and the notion does
not figure in any other statute, the European Union reinforces the
case law by recognizing price squeeze claims through nonbinding
acts. Price squeeze claims thereby gain policy recognition.
B. Market Definition and Market Power
To appreciate the impact of a firm's behavior on competition, one
must first precisely identify the relevant market and know the firm's

114. Id. para. 119.
115.
Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Prioritiesin Applying Article 82
of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009
O.J. (C 45) 7 [hereinafter Article 82 EC Guidance]. The document lays out the
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to
exclusionary conduct and aims at achieving greater clarity and predictability regarding
its framework analysis, without prejudice from the interpretation of the law by the
Court of Justice and Court of First Instance. Id. paras. 2-3.
116.
Id. paras. 75-82.
117.
Id. para. 80 (citation omitted).
118.
See generally 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1 741e2, at 228-33
(discussing long-run incremental cost).
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 80.
119.
See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 437 (2d
120.
Cir. 1945) (considering the downstream costs of rolling sheet as a fair measure of the
costs for competitors).

2010]

DIDTRINKO RL4LLY KILL ANTITRUST PRICE SQUEEZE CLAIMS?

1093

position in that market.' 2 ' With this understanding, the firm's power
in that particular market can be assessed. 122 Two markets need to be
delimited in order to examine price squeeze abuse: an upstream
market, where a vertically integrated firm has a monopoly and sells
wholesale goods to its competitors, and a downstream market, where
this monopolist competes with the same competitors to sell its
transformed retail services. Using a price squeeze, the vertically
integrated firm tries to extend its position in the upstream market to
the downstream market, leading to its competitors' exclusion.123
Therefore, the cases discussed above need to define the markets and
assess the market power.
1.

Market Definition

The market definition consists of two dimensions: the product
market and the geographic market. 124 When it comes to networks
built under monopoly protection, the traditional formal product
market definition in telecommunications networks comes up against
several difficulties related to fixed costs and lack of market
efficiency.12 5 Moreover, the rapidly innovating sector blurs market
delimitations and makes it difficult to appreciate potential

Access Notice, supra note 46, para. 39 ("In the course of investigating
121.
cases . .. the Commission will base itself on the approach to the definition of relevant
markets set out in the Commission's Notice on the definition of the relevant market for
the purposes of Community competition law."); J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing the Price
Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 279, 280-

81 (2008); see also Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the
Purposes of Community Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5, 5 (explaining that
market definition makes it possible to calculate market shares that convey meaningful
information regarding market power).
122.
See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993)
(suggesting that the relevant market must be identified in order to assess a firm's
market power); Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 9 ('The assessment of
whether an undertaking is in a dominant position and of the degree of market power it
holds is a first step in the application of Article 82."); Access Notice, supra note 46,
paras. 63-69 (describing factors that may be relevant in determining if a company
enjoys a dominant position in the market); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 938 (1981) ('The standard
method of proving market power in antitrust cases involves first defining a relevant
market in which to compute the defendant's market share, next computing that share,
and then deciding whether it is large enough to support an inference of the required
degree of market power.").
123.
Sidak, supranote 121, at 280.
124.
2B PHILIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SoLow, ANTITRUST
LAW I 530a, at 225 (3d ed. 2007).
125.
Jordi Gual, Market Definition in the Telecoms Industry, in THE EcoNOMICS
OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 45, 52-64 (Pierre A. Buigues
& Patrick Rey eds., 2004).
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competition, the impact of services bundling, and product
integration. 126
These difficulties probably explain why there is no specific
product or geographic market analysis in the Linkline decision. Chief
Justice Roberts only mentioned that the case involves the market for
DSL services at both wholesale and retail levels, and he observed that
competing DSL providers must generally obtain access to AT&T's
facilities to serve their customers.12 7 He also observed that the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) abandoned the forcedsharing requirement in the light of the emergence of a competitive
market for high-speed Internet service. Moreover, DSL faced "robust
competition" from cable companies, wireless, and satellite services.12 8
At the same time, however, the decision reports that "AT&T owns
much of the infrastructure and facilities needed to provide DSL
services in California" and, in particular, that AT&T controls most of
the "last mile." 129 The product and geographic markets remain
confused.
Furthermore, although Chief Justice Roberts relied on the FCC
observations, the sector regulation market definition does not
substitute for an antitrust definition in specific cases.
Each
regulation and antitrust law considers markets for the purpose of the
application of its own rules. Therefore, markets are delimited for the
scope of application of the regulation or antitrust law and are not
necessarily equivalent. Considering these differences, regulation and
antitrust laws could pertain to different markets depending on the
particularities of each specific case. As a consequence, the markets
delimited by regulatory statutes and by antitrust laws are not
necessarily the same. Where a regulatory statute identifies "robust
competition" 130 in, say, a national broadband market, antitrust laws
may define a smaller product and geographic market, like DSL in a
specific regional. Of course, the bigger the market, the stronger the
competition, and market delineation will influence the determination
of market power.131
In Deutsche Telekom, the European Commission identified two
relevant product and service markets: the market in local network
access for competitors at the wholesale level and markets with access

126.
ANTONIO BAvAsso, COMMUNICATIONS IN EU ANTITRUST LAW 103-60 (2003);
Gual, supra note 125, at 52-64; see also Sidak, supra note 121, at 300-01 (asserting
that defining the proper market becomes more difficult with rapid technological change
and product bundling).
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115 (2009).
127.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
See infra Part III.2.b.
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to narrowband and broadband connections at the retail level. 132 In
Germany, no other infrastructure was sufficiently developed to be
substitutable. No other network could reach the entire national
territory or achieve such a level of capillarity because Deutsche
Telekom's network had been developed with huge investments over
many years and was protected by a monopoly.1 33 The geographic
market was national.
In Telef6nica, the European Commission investigated the
Spanish telecommunications markets with extreme care and
identified all of the standard broadband products (whether provided
through ADSL or any other technology) marketed on the "mass
market" for both residential and nonresidential users as belonging to
the relevant retail market. 134 The Commission found two relevant
wholesale markets: "the market for wholesale broadband access for
which traffic [was] delivered at the regional level and the market for
wholesale broadband access for which traffic [was] delivered at one
national hand-over point."13 5 All other technologies distinct from
ADSL were excluded because demand-side substitution at the
wholesale level is firstly constrained by the significant cost of
switching from one technological platform to another.13 6 Demandside substitution at the wholesale level is also constrained by the
difference in geographic coverage between ADSL and other
technologies: while ADSL covers the whole territory, only 40 percent
or less of the population can get broadband access based on other
technologies.13 7 This fact would prohibit a wholesale purchaser of
cable broadband access from offering its services throughout the
entire Spanish territory.' 3 8 Therefore, the geographic markets are
39
national at both levels.'
2.

Market Power

Once the relevant markets are delimited, market power is
assessed by examining whether the integrated firm holds a position
that confers the capacity to affect market conditions by setting the

Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578,
132.
37.57-Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, para. 96.
Id. paras. 13, 21, 83.
133.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
134.
Espaila v. Telef6nica, para. 161.
Id. para. 208.
135.
Id. paras. 200, 208.
136.
See id. para. 201 ("[Only about 40% of the population can get broadband
137.
access based on cable modem.").
Id. paras. 201-03.
138.
Id. para. 219.
139.
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wholesale price:140 "a firm lacking market power cannot possibly rise
to the level of an antitrust violation because it has no chance of
reducing consumer welfare."141
A price squeeze involves two
markets, which raises questions of how to assess the market power
and in which market(s) the power should lie.
Although the usual market structure characteristics-such as
market share, potential competition, and barriers to entry-are the
criteria for assessing market power in the telecommunications sector,
Erik and Herbert Hovenkamp note that the "ability to impose narrow
margins that are harmful to unintegrated rivals does not require
market power in the classic sense at all."142 Even in a case where
some competition can be observed, a firm's power can arise from a
specific asset. For the cases studied here, that asset is the DSL
network. 143 It represents an essential input for the competitors using
it, in that they have no substitute because they made a substantial
investment in a particular technology that "inexorably" links their
business to the vertically integrated firm's asset. 144 This linkage
leads to the leveraging theory.
Adopted by the Supreme Court in 1948,145 the leveraging theory
suggests that firms use monopoly power in one market to acquire a
competitive advantage in a second market. It has been challenged in
the United States and is often considered to be no longer viable
because the element of an attempt to monopolize needs to be met for
the second market as well.146
In the Linkline case, Chief Justice Roberts relied on the fact that
the FCC abandoned the forced-sharing access requirement "in light of
the emergence of a competitive market beyond DSL for high-speed
Internet service," while DSL faced 'robust competition' from cable
140.
See Case C-333/94 P, Tetra Pak Int'l SA v. Comm'n, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5951
(penalizing Tetra Pak for predatory pricing where there was a risk that competitors
would be eliminated from the market); Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v.
Comm'n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, para. 39 (explaining that large market share is one factor
contributing to dominance and that dominant firms can influence market conditions);
cf. Access Notice, supra note 46, paras. 65-69 (noting that in vertical
telecommunications markets, infrastructure costs typically constitute the single largest
cost of downstream operations, but that in other situations involving closely-related
markets it may be possible for particular operators to exert a high degree of market
power in other ways).
141.
Sidak, supra note 121, at 305.
142.
Erik N. Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price
Squeeze Claims, 51 ARIZ. L. REv. 273, 283 (2009).
143.
Id.
144.
Id.; see also Geradin & O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 358-59 (noting that
downstream competitors who rely on alternate technologies will not be as affected by
price changes).
145.
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1948).
146.
3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 11652b2, at 135-40; HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 321-22 (2005).
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companies and wireless and satellite services."147 No further analysis
was provided and relevant markets were not properly defined to
determine whether and to what extent AT&T retained its market
power in the upstream or downstream market.148 In fact, three
unanswered questions related to market power from the perspective
of the application of § 2 of the Sherman Act remain. First, is there a
market power? Second, is the vertically integrated undertaking
trying to obtain and maintain a monopoly power, and is it in the same
market where it already has a market power or in a downstream
market? Third, how does the price squeeze assist the vertically
integrated firm in this project? Indeed, if DSL faces "robust
competition"149 in both the upstream and downstream markets, it is
difficult to see how AT&T could achieve enough market power to
violate § 2 of the Sherman Act, even if the company could exclude its
DSL competitors from the market. 5 0 In this circumstance, there is
no need to look for a price squeeze. If AT&T holds market power in
the upstream market, does it need to fulfill the criteria of an attempt
to monopolize in the downstream market? If AT&T does not need
market power "in the classic sense" because it possesses an essential
asset for competitors,15 is the firm trying to leverage its upstream
market power to the downstream market through a price squeeze? Is
a "too-high price" in the upstream market relevant for the upstream
or the downstream market?1 52 Unfortunately, Linkline leaves these
questions unanswered.
European jurisprudence applies Article 102 of the TFEU to the
downstream market if the dominant firm uses its market power "on a
neighbouring but separate market where it is not in a dominant
position, with the possibility of eliminating all competition on that
market." 5 3 Though the leading case concerns horizontal markets,
the same analysis is applicable to a vertically integrated market.154
However, as Damien Geradin and Robert O'Donoghue explain, if the
firm is not dominant in the downstream market, there is a need for
"some credible basis for saying that foreclosure concerns are likely to

147.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115 (2009).
148.
See id. (declining to specifically address AT&T's market power).
149.
Id. ("DSL now faces robust competition from cable companies and wireless
and satellite services.").
150.
See United States v. E. 1. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394
(1956) ("[W]here there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their
purposes, illegal monopoly does not exist merely because the product said to be
monopolized differs from others . . . .").
151.
See Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 283 (noting an
integrated firm that provides an input to a downstream competitor can, in some cases,
exercise a nontraditional form of market power that is not dependent on market share).

152.
153.
154.

See discussion infra Part 111.3.
Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Intl SA v. Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-755, para. 115.
Access Notice, supra note 46, para. 65.
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arise on a market in which no firm is dominant and that these
concerns are likely to lead to higher prices over time."15 5
In the Deutsche Telekom case, the European Commission easily
established Deutsche Telekom's market power by finding that the
former monopolist still held a market share ranging from 90-100
Additionally, it was highly
percent in the relevant markets.
improbable that potential competitors could build a similar network
at a national level in the foreseeable future, considering that it would
not be economically profitable with existing technologies. 156 These
barriers to entry were likely to restrict competition on the
downstream market.
In the Telef6nica case, the Commission again carefully examined
Telef6nica's market power. On the regional wholesale market,
Telef6nica maintained a de facto monopoly, not restrained by any
Indeed, there were and are considerable
potential entries. 157
structural barriers preventing competitors' investments in local loop
unbundling from having a significant impact on competition in this
market, and any such impact will never extend to the whole Spanish
territory. 158 Moreover, economies of scale and scope, and vertical
integration are not available for alternative competitors in the
regional wholesale market.i 5 9 At the national wholesale level,
Telef6nica's market share is eleven times larger than its largest
competitor's market share. 160 The former monopolist benefits from
economies of scale and scope in this market as well. Furthermore,
Telef6nica maintains its ability to significantly influence the
availability of competing wholesale products because any wholesale
alternative must be based on Telef6nica's local loop. 161 Considering
these barriers to entry, Telef6nica was able to leverage its dominant
position from the lower network levels (local loop and regional
wholesale market) to the national wholesale market, thanks to its
control over the infrastructure inherited from the former
monopoly. 162 Thus, the Commission was able to find that Telef6nica
holds a dominant position in both wholesale markets. 163 Though it is
not necessary under Article 102 of the TFEU to demonstrate a
dominant position in the retail market to prove a margin squeeze, the

Geradin & O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 408.
155.
Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578,
156.
37.57-Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, paras. 96-101.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
157.
Espafia v. Telef6nica, paras. 223-26.
158.
Id. paras. 223-29.
159.
Id. para. 226.
160.
Id. para. 236.
161.
Id. para. 240.
Id. para. 241.
162.
Id. paras. 241-42.
163.
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Commission completed its analysis by establishing that Telef6nica
was dominant in this market as well. 164
Telefdnica demonstrates that foreclosure on the retail market
was a rational and profitable strategy for three reasons:16 5 first, the
profit extracted from a high-level retail price surpassed the forsaken
wholesale profit; second, creating and maintaining a leading position
in the provision of retail broadband led to a loyalty effect on another
market, namely, fixed lines; and, finally, Telef6nica was preempting
the future blooming market of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and
television over broadband. 166
C. Values and References

In Alcoa, Judge Hand concluded that Alcoa fixed its wholesale
market price at such a high level that the spread between the cost of
ingots and the costs of rolling was insignificant or negative, based on
Alcoa's own costs, thus eliminating competitors from the downstream
market. 167 This test is known as the "transfer price test."1 6 s
Linkline rejected this test as lacking any grounding in prior
jurisprudence. The Court stated that "[a]n upstream monopolist with
no duty to deal is free to charge whatever wholesale price it would
like; antitrust law does not forbid lawfully obtained monopolies from
charging monopoly prices."169 This is true as long as it concerns only
the upstream market and as long as upstream and downstream
markets are strictly distinct. But, if the monopolist were trying to
use a lawfully obtained monopoly to obtain a monopoly in another
market not competing on the merits, then the level of the upstream
price should matter, and it should be considered in relation to the
downstream price.
An insufficient or negative spread between wholesale and retail
prices can find its origin in a too-high wholesale price or a too-low
retail price set by the integrated firm, or in a combination of both.170
In Linkline, after refusing to consider the wholesale price because
there was no duty to deal in the wholesale market, the Court

164.
Id. paras. 243-44.
165.
Id. paras. 611-13.
166.
Id.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 427-29 (2d
167.
Cir. 1945).
168.
Joskow, supranote 87, 186-87.
169.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1122 (2009)
(citing Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004)).
170.
3B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, 1 767c, at 137; NIHOUL &
RODFORD, supra note 1, at 427 (2004); Geradin & O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 357-58
(explaining that a vertically-integrated dominant firm can use its control over
downstream rivals in several different ways).
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examined the assertion that the defendant's retail prices were too low
to qualify as a predatory claim.1 7' But a price squeeze should not be
mistaken for predatory pricing. A price squeeze strategy implies two
vertically related markets, where the competitors need the input from
the dominant firm to compete downstream. The anticompetitive
strategy used in the upstream market and its impact on price would
not be evaluated properly under a predatory pricing claim. Indeed,
the price in the downstream market is not necessarily so low as to be
considered predatory, the dominant firm is not necessarily losing
money applying its anticompetitive strategy, and retail customers do
not necessarily benefit from a lower retail price as they would with
predatory prices.' 7 2 The abuse targets the competitors' investment
capacity, based on all firm-relevant costs, rather than a retail
price.173 This is why there is no need to demonstrate that retail
prices are abusive as such. Indeed, given that the abusive nature of
the firm's behavior is connected to the unfairness of the spread,
and retail prices should not be considered
wholesale

independently.17 4

In contrast to Linkline, the European Commission adopted the
The
Alcoa cost framework in Deutsche Telekom in 2003.175
Commission determined that there is a margin squeeze when "the
difference between the retail prices charged by a dominant
undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its competitors for
comparable services is negative, or insufficient to cover the productspecific costs to the dominant operator of providing its own retail
services on the downstream market."176 The Commission added that
this spread is negative if the wholesale charges are higher than the
retail charges, and "in that case there is a margin squeeze in any
Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1118-19.
171.
172.
Geradin & O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 367 (explaining five main
differences between a margin squeeze and a pure predation case); Hovenkamp &
Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 293, 298 (suggesting that the Brooke Group test
proposed in Linkline is not appropriate for a price squeeze strategy because it does not
reflect anticompetitive strategies or fully appreciate the impact of upstream price
manipulation).
Geradin & O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 367 (stating that in a pure
173.
predation case the competition authority looks to all relevant costs of the dominant
company, whereas in a margin squeeze case it looks only to the costs in the
downstream market).
174.
Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, 5
C.L.M.R. 9, para. 167 (2008) (finding that the Commission was not required to
demonstrate specifically that Telekom's retail prices were abusive because the nature
of the abusive conduct was connected with the unfairness of the price spread).
175.
Deutsche Telekom AG, 5 C.L.M.R. para. 107; see also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 438 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that such a
price spread was unlawful).
176.
Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578,
37.57-Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, para. 107.
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event, irrespective of the product-specific costs." 17 7 If the wholesale
charges are lower than the retail charges, the spread is positive. 7 8
When the spread is positive, there can be a price squeeze only "if the
spread is not sufficient to enable the historic operator to cover the
product-specific costs of providing its services to end-users," that is, if
both prices are not above costs.17 9 In other words, if both of its prices
are above costs, the dominant firm is not abusing its position. 8 0
The pricing practice was determined on the basis of the
dominant undertaking's own costs, in conformity with European case
law.' 8 ' The Court of First Instance held that any other approach
would be considered harmful to the general principle of legal
certainty, because if the lawfulness of the dominant firm depended on
the particular situation of the competitors, the dominant undertaking
''would not be in a position to assess the lawfulness of its own
activities" as it would depend on unknown cost data. 182 This "equally
efficient competitor test" is preferred to a "hypothetical reasonably
efficient competitor" test, which would demonstrate that the spread
was insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient provider in the
downstream market to make a reasonable profit. 8 3 Nevertheless,
the "equally efficient competitor test" is favorable to the vertically
integrated firm because its unit cost can be expected to be lower than
those of a reasonably efficient rival, due to economies of scale and
scope.18 4
Cost allocation is a key factor in setting the measure upon which
a price squeeze is evaluated, especially in network industries, where
there are large fixed costs. 185 Therefore, the European Commission
considered that the relevant cost measure is the LRAIC, in order to

177.
Id. para. 138.
178.
Id.
179.
Id.
180.
Cf. Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 281 (noting that Alcoa
never insisted on a showing that downstream prices were lower than cost).
181.
Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres Sph6riques v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. II03755, para. 179; Case C6-2/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359,
para. 74; Commission Decision of 18 July 1988, Case IV/30.178-Napier Brown/British
Sugar, 1988 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 0518, para. 66.
182.
Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, 5
C.L.M.R. 9, para. 192 (2008).
183.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
Espafia v. Telef6nica, paras. 311, 313.
184.
Id. para. 314; cf. Sidak, supra note 121, 298 (noting that a vertically
integrated firm might have no incentive to use a price squeeze because the firm could
merely raise the price of the bottleneck input and not need to manipulate the margin in
order to extract the monopoly rent).
185.
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TOWARD COMPETITION
IN LocAL TELEPHONY 69, 78 (Cheryl Weissman ed., 1994) (discussing the application of
the cost floor and price ceiling calculations to large firms with fixed costs).
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assess the ability to operate profitably in the long term. 186 This cost
measure is not contested in U.S. case law and economic literature,
but U.S. jurisprudence does not consider the LRAIC to be an
antitrust law issue, but rather a regulatory task for which antitrust
courts are ill-suited.1 8 7
D. Possible Justifications
A price squeeze may be justified 88 if it enhances consumers'
welfare' 89 by bringing lower prices, better products, or more efficient
production methods.190 If the dominant undertaking is more efficient
than potential efficient competitors, a price squeeze is not
problematic.191 E.U. law generally holds that an undertaking's
conduct may be objectively necessary or produce substantive
efficiencies outweighing any anticompetitive effects on consumers,
but the conduct must be indispensible and proportionate "on the basis
of factors external to the dominant undertaking."192

Telefdnica, Case COMP/38.784, para. 318; Article 82 EC Guidance, supra
186.
note 115, para. 80.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1121 (2009)
187.
(quoting Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408, 415 (2004)); Sidak, supra note 121, at 296 (noting that in the United States, a
price squeeze analysis resembles a public utilities commission rather than a federal
judicial antitrust case); see Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 292 (noting
Linkline and other literature have concluded that price squeezes should only be
condemned under a strict cost-based test).
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, paras. 28-31; see generally 3B
188.
773e, at 253-58 (discussing the role of
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
reasonableness and justifications in the refusal to deal and essential facility doctrines);
Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and
Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1046-47 (1987) (discussing the effects
of efficiency justifications on antitrust analysis and enforcement).
See infra Part VI for a discussion of competition goals.
189.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973) (stating
190.
that the Sherman Act assumes an enterprise will protect itself against loss by
operating with superior service, lower costs, and improved efficiency); Sidak, supra
note 121, at 305 (quoting Town of Concord v. Boston Ed. Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
Marcel Canoy, Paul de Bijl & Ron Kemp, Access to Telecommunications
191.
IN
REGULATION
AND
ANTITRUST
OF
EcONOMIcS
in THE
Networks,
TELECOMMUNICATION, supra note 125, at 135, 150 (stating that "[ihf the incumbent
operates more efficiently than its (potential) competitors and the customers reap the
benefits, the lack of entrants/competitors is not an issue"); see also Town of Concord,
915 F.2d at 18, 20 (citing the Alcoa test that allows the dominant undertaking to be
more efficient than potential efficient competitors).
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, paras. 28-30; cf. Otter Tail Power
192.
Co., 410 U.S. at 380 n.10 (citing Village of Elbow Lake v. Otter Tail Power Co., 46
F.P.C. 675, 678 (1971)) (stating that public interest is far broader than the economic
interest of a particular power supplier and that "[t]he private company's lack of
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The defendant in Telef6nica attempted to characterize its
behavior as objectively necessary. 193 Telef6nica alleged that it
lowered its prices on the retail market to align with those charged by
its competitors.194 This "meeting competition" defense may be
justified as defending a firm's own economic interests, but it "may not
legitimize a behavior whose effects is to leverage and abuse an
upstream dominance." 195 The Commission reminded Telef6nica that
a justifiable price squeeze must be suitable, indispensable, and
proportionate based on factors external to the dominant
undertaking. 9 6 In this case, a price squeeze resulting from a retail
price reduction was not indispensable because Telef6nica could have
lowered its wholesale price to avoid this result.197
A firm can justify its behavior by demonstrating either that it is
indispensable and proportionate, as Telef6nica attempted to do, or
that the behavior produces substantial efficiencies.19 8 In the latter
case, four conditions must be fulfilled: the efficiencies must be
realized as a result of the conduct; the conduct must be indispensable;
the efficiencies must outweigh any likely negative effects; and the
conduct may not eliminate effective competition.1 99 In relation to
price squeezing, the Commission is careful to ensure that the
dominant firm realizes an adequate return on investments to
generate incentive to continue to invest, and that its own innovation
is not negatively affected by the obligation to supply or by structural
charges. 200
In the United States, J. Gregory Sidak postulates that efficiencyenhancing conduct and competitive pricing allow vertically integrated
firms to cut retail prices, 201 and this idea is compatible with E.U.
competition law when the above-mentioned four conditions are met.
IV. PRICE SQUEEZE AND DUTY To DEAL

In Linkline, the Court asked "whether a plaintiff can bring pricesqueeze claims under [§ 2] of the Sherman Act when the defendant

enthusiasm for the arrangement cannot deter us, so long as the public interest requires
it").
193.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
Espaila v. Telef6nica, paras. 637, 641.
194.
Id. para. 637.
195.
Id. para. 638.
196.
Id. para. 639.
197.
Id.
198.
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 30.
199.
Id.
200.
Id. paras. 89-90.
201.
Sidak, supranote 121, at 294.
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has no antitrust duty to deal .... ."202 The Court then looked for a
duty to deal. Finding none, the Court concluded that, when there is
no duty to deal, a firm can impose any contractual condition it
pleases.20 3 Thus, the Court linked price squeeze to a prior duty to
deal. This Part considers whether the Court asked the right question
and examines the possible link between price squeezes and refusals
to deal. It concludes that a price squeeze constitutes a constructive
refusal to deal that could violate § 2 of the Sherman Act.
A. Link Between Price Squeeze and Duty to Deal
In Linkline, the plaintiffs alleged that AT&T squeezed its
204
margins to exclude competitors and preserve monopoly control.
Instead of asking whether this squeezing was anticompetitive and
violated § 2, the Court first looked for a duty to deal before eventually
analyzing the anticompetitive conditions of the deal. Thus, the Court
subordinated the price squeeze to a prior duty to deal. The Court
grounded its reasoning on Trinko, holding that "a firm with no
antitrust duty to deal with its rivals at all is under no obligation to
provide those rivals with a 'sufficient' level of service."2 05
Trinko alleged that the delay in providing telecommunication
services constituted a refusal to supply: the delayed provision of
service was a constructive refusal to deal, constituting a violation of
§ 2. But the Court found that a refusal to supply in this case could
not be anticompetitive and violate § 2.206 Consequently, a fortiori,
the conditions of provision of the service could not be anticompetitve
and violate § 2. The Court's reasoning did not subordinate the
conditions of provision of the service to a prior duty to deal. Instead,
Trinko recognized that, under certain circumstances, a refusal to
cooperate with rivals could constitute anticompetitive conduct and
can violate § 2 of the Sherman Act.2 07 Second, the Court recognized

202.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1116-17
(2009).
Id. at 1119 (stating that "a firm with no duty to deal in the wholesale
203.
market has no obligation to deal under terms and conditions favorable to its
competitors").
Id. (stating that, just like the complaint in Trinko, the plaintiffs allege that
204.
the defendants abused their power in the wholesale market to prevent rivals from
competing).
Id. at 1115, 1119 (citing Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
205.
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004)).
206.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408, 410, 416.
207.
Id. at 409-11.
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that the refusal to deal does not need to be expressly stated; it can be
constructive. 208
The imposition of an excessively high price "amounts to a refusal
to supply at a commercially acceptable price." 209 This is the view
taken by the Commission in the European Union, where, among
other practices, a price squeeze is considered a constructive refusal to
supply.2 10 Consequently, and relying on Trinko, the price squeeze
can itself constitute a refusal to deal.21 1 As Chief Justice Roberts
rightly stated, "for antitrust purposes, there is no reason to
distinguish between price and nonprice components of a
transaction." 212 For this reason, the only question to answer is
whether AT&T monopolized or attempted to monopolize a certain
market through a price squeeze. But subordinating a price squeeze to
a prior duty to deal, like Linkline does, distorts Trinko's reading,
extending it beyond its intended reach. Indeed, limiting antitrust
control over elements of a transaction to cases where there is a prior
duty to deal, as Linkline asks, drastically reduces its scope.
B. Price Squeeze Claim Under § 2

In determining whether margin squeezing constitutes
anticompetitive conduct in the same way as a refusal to cooperate, a
court would, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, look for some evidence of
monopolization or an attempt to monopolize. 213 Section 2 of the
Sherman Act applies when there is a monopoly power, but the mere
fact of monopoly power does not violate § 2: monopolization is illegal
only when a firm tries to obtain or maintain a monopoly power
through means that are anticompetitive or inefficient. 214 Contrary to
Europe, where the application of Article 102 of the TFEU is, in

208.

See id. at 409 (noting that in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highands Skiing

Co., 472 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1985), the Court held that a jury could have interpreted a
defendant's refusal to recreate a joint ticket in the short term as a way of reducing
competition in the long run).
209.
VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW
AND PRACTICE 200 (9th ed. 2007).
210.
See Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 80 (noting a dominant
undertaking might charge a price for a product on the upstream market which does not
allow an equally efficient competitor to trade profitably in the downstream market).

211.

Cf. Ellen Meriwether, Putting The "Squeeze" on Refusal to Deal Cases:

Lessons from Trinko and Linkline, 24 ANTITRUST 65, 66-67 (2010) (arguing that
although the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a price squeeze claim can be
recast as a predatory pricing claim, such claims must be grounded on an unlawful
refusal to deal).
212.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1119 (2009).
213.
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)
(explaining the offense of monopoly under the Sherman Act).
214.
Id.
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principle, purely objective, 215 the firm's intent is the second element
of the antitrust claim in the United States.21 6
1.

Monopoly Power

In Linkline, the Court assumed that there was no duty to deal
other than the duty derived from regulation. 217 The Court found it
"quite unlikely" that AT&T had a duty to deal based on a monopoly
power because the regulatory authority saw the market for highspeed Internet services as competitive. 218 This is a paradox of the
Linkline decision. Indeed, if there is no monopoly power in the
upstream market,2 19 there cannot be any antitrust liability, whether
based on a duty to deal or on a price squeeze itself, because the first
condition of § 2 of the Sherman Act is not met.220 To demonstrate
liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a claimant needs to
demonstrate both monopoly power and anticompetitive conduct. 22 1 If
the Court actually intended to ask whether a plaintiff could bring

215.
Alexandros Stratakis, Comparative Analysis of the US and EU Approach
and Enforcement of the EssentialFacilitiesDoctrine, 27 EuR. COMPETITION L. REV. 434,
434-35 (2006) (comparing U.S. antitrust law to the European law, where intent is not
an element of Article 82). Intent is nevertheless considered in cases of predatory
pricing. See Barry E. Hawk, Article 82 and Section 2: Abuse and Monopolizing Conduct,
in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLIcY 875, 875-76 (Wayne Dayle Collins ed.,
2008) ("Although intent is not expressly a general substantive element of an Article 82
violation, it has been cited as an element in certain kinds of abuses, notably predatory
pricing claims where the challenged prices are above average variable (or avoidable)
cost but below average total cost."). See generally Commission Decision of 16 July 2003,
COMP/38.233-Wanadoo Interactive, http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/antitrust/cases/
decisions/38233/en.pdf (analyzing the application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, later
renamed Article 102 of the TFEU).
See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
216.
540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) ('To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of
monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of
anticompetitive conduct."); HERBERT HOVEMKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, 278-79 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the role of
intent in various monopolization cases). But cf. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1,
651c, at 109-16 (arguing that formulations requiring "purpose" or "intent" generally
are unnecessary and sometimes harmful).
Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1113-14 (holding that there is no duty to deal while
217.
acknowledging the statutory limitations arising from the Sherman Act).
218.
Id. at 1118 n.2. The Supreme Court implicitly acknowledges at least some
market power as it observes that AT&T "remains bound to regulatory interconnection
requirements," including a control on prices, but once again, the Court fails to provide
a market definition. Id. at 1115.
219.
See supra Part 111.2 for a discussion of market defintion and market power.
220.
See Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1120 (stating that the first condition of the
Sherman Act is that the plaintiff must demonstrate the prices are below an
appropriate measure of the rival's costs).

221.

Id.
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price squeeze claims under § 2 of the Sherman Act when the
defendant has no monopoly power, the answer is rightly negative. 222
2.

Intent

If monopoly power can be demonstrated, a price squeeze claim
can be brought under § 2 if it shows the "willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power" as opposed to efficient and competitive
behavior. 223 Regarding intent, U.S. and E.U. cases agree that a
refusal to supply constitutes anticompetitive conduct if it suggests a
willingness to achieve an anticompetitive end by foreclosing a market
to rivals. 224 If AT&T maintained monopoly power in the upstream
market, the question becomes whether there was anticompetitive
conduct and, consequently, whether by reducing margins between the
wholesale and retail prices, the firm intentionally attempted to
exclude competitors from the downstream market or raise barriers to
entry at the upstream input level, and, ultimately, whether such
conduct harms consumers. 225
U.S. case law places great importance on the notion of intent to
determine whether the refusal to cooperate can constitute
anticompetitive conduct. The Supreme Court case Aspen Skiing Co.
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. infers the anticompetitive intent
from the termination of a voluntary course of dealing and from the
unwillingness to sell the final good to the competitor even at a retail
price. 226 In Trinko, the Court could not find any anticompetitive
intent in the reluctance to interconnect networks following the
regulatory condition, nor in any prior conduct by the company.2 27 In
Linkline, however, the decision says nothing about AT&T's intent to
reduce competition.22 8
See id. (noting the Court has carefully limited the circumstances under
222.
which a plaintiff can state a Sherman Act claim in order to avoid chilling competition).
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
223.
See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States
224.
and the European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness,61 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 981, 1000-02 (1986) (comparing U.S. and European cases regarding intent); see
also, e.g., CHRISTOPHER W. BELLAMY & GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF
COMPETITION 618-19 (Viven Rose ed., 4th ed. 1993) (discussing exclusionary and
exploitative abuse described in Article 82); Sidak, supra note 121, at 281 (comparing
the Trinko holding to the Article 82 rule regarding price squeezes, both of which
require a showing of an actual monopolization of a market).
225.
Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 278, 298; Sidak, supra note
121, at 305 (quoting Town of Concord v. Boston Ed. Co., 915 F.2d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir.
1990)).
226.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603-04
(1985).
227.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 409 (2004) (holding that the refusal to deal in the present case did not fit within
the Aspen Skiing exception).
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
228.
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Because the Court overlooked both conditions of liability under
the Sherman Act, the impact of Linkline is uncertain. However, this
case gives the impression that the Court felt uncomfortable
examining whether conditions of § 2 could be fulfilled.
C. Protection of Investments
Although the Court is concerned that compelled sharing may
diminish incentive to invest and innovate, 229 the Linkline decision
says nothing about the impact of pricing policy on investments. This
concern probably led the Court to conflate the duty to deal based on
the essential facilities doctrine (which is not pertinent since Trinko
refused to consider an essential facilities doctrine as established
law) 2 30 with a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Therefore, the
question is whether price squeezing is a valid claim under § 2 of the
Sherman Act, despite the fact that there is no obligation to grant
access to the network based on an essential facilities doctrine (either
because the doctrine is not recognized or because the infrastructure is
not indispensable to provide the downstream product). 231
The European Commission confronted the same problem in
Telef6nica.232 Indeed, Telef6nica alleged in its defense that it was
erroneous to consider its pricing policy as subject to Article 102 of the
TFEU because there was no antitrust obligation to grant access to its
network, given that the criteria applied in the European Union to
define whether an essential facility has to be shared were not
fulfilled. 233 Indeed,
(i) there are real and/or potential alternatives to the regional and
national wholesale access services of Telef6nica (ULL and wholesale
access to cable networks), (ii) the regional and national wholesale
access services of Telef6nica can be replicated and (iii) the alleged
conduct is not likely to eliminate all competition on the downstream
market.234

Telef6nica argued that an efficient undertaking can reproduce the
input, and, not having any duty to deal under Article 102 of the

229.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08.
230.
See id. at 410 ("To the extent respondent's 'essential facilities' argument is
distinct from its general [Sherman Act § 2] argument, [the Court] reject[s] it.").
231. Id.
See Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
232.
Espafia v. Telef6nica, paras. 300-01 (describing Telef6nica's arguments as to why it
should not be subject to Article 82 of the EC Treaty, later renamed Article 102 TFEU).
Id. para. 301; see also Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v.
233.
Mediaprint Zeitungs-und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791,
paras. 43-46 (applying the judgment in Magill, 1995 ECR 1-743 (joining Cases C241/91P and C-242/91P) to determine Article 82 abuse).
Telef6nica, Case COMP/38.784, para. 301.
234.
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TFEU, it could not be compelled to control its wholesale price under
competition law. 235
The Commission examined the claim under the general
framework of Article 102 of the TFEU because its list of abusive
practices is not exhaustive. 236 The Commission first stated that there
was a regulatory duty to deal.23 7 Regarding the obligation to share
an essential facility, the Commission explained that the ex ante
incentive of the dominant firm to invest was not at stake, and
therefore the legal test developed by the European Court of Justice in
the framework of the application of the essential facilities doctrine
was not applicable.2 38 There were indeed no conflicting interests
between consumers' welfare and Telef6nica's incentive to invest in the
network. 239
The Commission further explained this conclusion in its Article
82 Guidance, released in December 2008.240 According to the
Commission, the obligation to supply a product or service at a specific
price, even if the remuneration is fair, requires a careful
consideration, as it may impact investments. 24 1 The Commission will
consider a price squeeze an enforcement priority when the practice
under scrutiny relates to a product or service that is objectively
necessary to compete effectively in a downstream market, is likely to
lead to the elimination of effective competition in the downstream
market, and is likely to harm consumers. 24 2 But when the price
control is not likely to affect the incentive to invest or innovate
upstream, the Commission finds no need to consider the three abovementioned circumstances and will apply the general enforcement
standard of Article 102 of the TFEU to a likely anticompetitive
foreclosure. 24 3 Incentive to invest or innovate is particularly unlikely
to be affected if there is a regulation imposing an obligation to supply
that already balances the risk of negative effects, if the input was
developed under specific or exclusive rights, or if public resources
financed the input.244 Investment in Telef6nica's network was made
under the protection of special or exclusive rights with no
consideration for mandatory access because Telef6nica developed its

235.
236.
237.
inputs).
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. paras. 192, 635, 643-45.
Id. para. 280.
Id. para. 303 (stating that Telef6nica has a duty to supply the upstream
Id. para. 309.
Id. para. 634.
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 75.
Id. para. 75.
Id. para. 81.
Id. para. 82.
Id. para. 82.
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network well before the advent of ADSL technology.2 45 There were
some costs involved in supporting broadband traffic but no need to
roll out a specific transport network. 24 6
Again, the Linkline decision says nothing about any potential
impact of a pricing policy on investments in the particular
situation.2 4 7 But the regulatory control of interconnections and the
control of AT&T over the last mile in California suggest that the
investments might not be affected and that, if European principles
were followed, the conditions of § 2 of the Sherman Act could apply. 248
V. RELATIONSHIP AND COORDINATION BETWEEN
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION

Sector regulation and antitrust laws pursue different goals.
While competition law principally addresses consumers' welfare,
regulation may favor redistributive objectives such as common
carriage in the United States, universal service and promotion of
network investments, 249 or environmental objectives. 250 As Trinko
explains regarding telecommunication regulation:
The 1996 Act is, in an important respect, much more ambitious than
the antitrust laws. It attempts "to eliminate the monopolies enjoyed by
the inheritors of AT&T's local franchises." Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, by contrast, seeks merely to prevent unlawful monopolization. It
251
would be a serious mistake to conflate the two goals.

Different authorities apply antitrust and regulatory procedures
at different levels (state, inter-state, and federal levels in the United

Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
245.
Espafla v. Telef6nica, para. 304.
Id. para. 305.
246.
247.
See generally Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109
(2009).
248.
See id. at 1115 ("AT&T controls most of what is known as the 'last mile'the lines that connect homes and businesses to the telephone network.").
See Telef6nica, Case COMP/38.784, para. 681 (stating that protecting
249.
competition and promoting investment are among the goals of regulation).
250.
See Michael Katz, Antitrust or Regulation? U.S. Public Policy in
Telecommunications Markets, in THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, supra note 125, at 243, 245 (describing both similarities and
differences between antitrust and regulatory approaches).
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
251.
398, 415 (2004) (citation omitted); see also Katz, supra note 250, at 246 (stating that
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, is much more
aggressive against monopolies than the Sherman Act).
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States, 252 and national and European Union levels in the European
Union 25 3), which may lead to conflicting interpretations or
inconsistencies. 254 Inconsistencies can also arise from facts based on
an ex ante regulatory decision in the European Union, whereas an
assessment of price compatibility with Article 102 of the TFEU is
executed ex post based on the most recent historical data. 255
Moreover, margin squeezing can result from the incorrect
allocation to the access price, of products and services that are
actually related to another regulated market where costs are covered;
from an incorrect reporting of internal transfer prices; or from an
unbalanced report of charges that inadequately reflects costs. 2 56
Conflicting ratemaking principles can also lead to margin
Considering these potential conflicts, this Part
squeezing. 257
examines the coordination rules that govern in the event that
antitrust and regulation rules apply concurrently.
Under U.S. law, regulated activities may be subject to antitrust
laws unless the statute purposely insulated such activity from the
operation of antitrust laws. 25 8 But, as Justice Scalia pointed out in
Trinko, the regulatory framework is an important characteristic of an
industry, and antitrust analysis must be "attuned" to this
characteristic. 259 If the regulatory structure is "designed to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm, the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small," but if the
regulatory scheme does not perform the "antitrust function,"260 "the
benefits of antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable
disadvantages." 261 There is a weighing of interests by the courts
between what can be achieved through the application of the

See City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 616 F.2d 976, 983-84
252.
(7th Cir. 1980) (describing the legal and political maze created by differing federal and
state regulatory procedures).
253.
See Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. 11-477,
5 C.L.M.R. 9, para. 11 (2008) (noting the possiblity of conflict between German national
law and EC competition policy).
City of Mishawaka, 616 F.2d at 983-84; Deutsche Telekom AG, 5 C.L.M.R.
254.
para. 113; see Joskow, supra note 87, at 191, 204 (describing the confusion caused by
the different approaches the courts and regulatory agencies take in regard to price
squeezing).
255.
See Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
Espafla v. Telef6nica, para. 494 (describing regulators' difficulty in predicting costs ex
ante).
256.
Canoy, et al., supra note 191, at 151.
257.
Id.
258.
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
259.
Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 411 (2004).
260.
Id. at 412.
Id. (citing Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963)).
261.
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regulatory framework and a costs-benefits evaluation of the antitrust
intervention. 262
If an activity is fully regulated in both upstream and
downstream markets, it is unlikely that a price squeeze could drive
competitors out of the market, particularly if the regulation is very
detailed compared to the more general regulatory framework applied
in the European Union. 263 However, differing regulatory procedures
can still offer opportunities to squeeze prices. 26 4 Even if only the
wholesale price is regulated, the regulatory agency should consider
the unregulated retail prices when setting wholesale rates, in order to
avoid price squeezing. 265
In Trinko, only the upstream market was regulated, but
regulatory responses were given by the FCC and the New York Public
Service Commission (PSC) to remedy and monitor the incumbent's
failure to service competitors' orders. 266 The FCC imposed a fine and
sophisticated weekly reporting requirements with specific penalties
for failing to comply. 2 67 The PSC imposed fines and a daily reporting
requirement. 2 68 The Court's opinion first examined whether there
was an antitrust duty to deal. 26 9 It asked whether there was a need
for such an antitrust obligation, but after considering the regulatory
requirement and its enforcement, the Court ultimately found that
"the [regulatory] regime is an effective steward of the antitrust
function."270
In Linkline, AT&T was obligated by regulation to "provide
wholesale DSL transport service to independent firms at a price no
greater than the retail price of AT&T's DSL service."2 71 The
downstream price was not regulated but was taken into account to fix
the regulated wholesale price. 2 72 Chief Justice Roberts explained
that there was no antitrust duty to deal, and the plaintiffs were left to
demonstrate that there was another antitrust liability for their
claim. 2 " No attention was given to the regulatory regime. 274 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Breyer observed that the respondents did

262.
263.
264.
Cir. 1980).
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 412-14.
Geradin & O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 417.
City of Mishawaka v. Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc., 616 F.2d 976, 983-84 (7th
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 279 (1976).
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 413.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 415.

270.

Id. at 413.

271.
272.
273.
274.

Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1115 (2009).
Id. at 1124 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 1122.
See generally id. at 1115-23.
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not claim that regulated prices at the wholesale level made any
difference; they "could have gone to the regulators and ask[ed] for the
petitioners' prices to be lowered in light of the alleged price
squeeze."27 5
In light of these two decisions, a claim asserting a regulated
market in the context of a regulated industry should first be brought
to the regulatory authority. 276 Then the plaintiff can go to a civil
court, alleging that the antitrust function is not fully and adequately
protected and that there is a ground for a liability under § 2 of the
Sherman Act. 277 Under this condition, Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion does not exclude a price squeeze claim outside the regulatory
context. 278
By comparison, regulation and competition rules apply
concurrently in the European Union, each within its own scope.
Undertakings abiding by sector-specific regulations are not absolved
from observing competition law requirements.2 7 9 If charges were
previously subject to a national authority's decision, two principles
apply. First, E.U. competition authorities are entitled to adopt a
decision under Article 102 of the TFEU, even if there is already a
decision by a national court on the matter or even if it may conflict
with a national competition authority's decision.28 0 Second, the case
law constantly reaffirms that "competition rules may apply where the
sector-specific legislation does not preclude the undertakings it
governs from engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents,
restricts or distorts competition."28 1
Both of these rules justified the intervention of the Commission
in Deutsche Telekom, where the rates were approved ex ante by the
national regulatory authority and Deutsche Telekom was regulated

275.

Id. at 1124 (Breyer, J., concurring).

See Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 EC: What Can the EU
276.
Learn from the U.S. Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the Wake of Microsoft,
IMS and Deutsche Telekom?, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1519, 1523 (2004) (stating that
when a regulatory structure exists, applying antitrust law is less desirable).
See Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1120 (describing the narrow circumstances
277.
under which a plaintiff can state a Sherman Act claim alleging that prices are too low).
Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 282; see also Meriwether,
278.
supra note 211, at 69-70 (comparing Trinko with Justice Breyer's earlier decision in

Town of Concord).
Access Notice, supra note 46, para. 19.
279.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
280.
Espafia v. Telef6nica, para. 677 (citing Case C-344/98, Masterfoods Ltd. v. HB Ice
Cream Ltd., 2000 E.C.R. I-11369, para. 48).
Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578,
281.
37.57-Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, para. 54; see also Telefdnica, Case
COMP/38.784, para. 666 ("In this respect, the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance have consistently held that competition rules may apply where sector specific
legislation does not preclude the undertakings it governs from engaging in autonomous
conduct that prevents, restricts or distort competition.").
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in both the wholesale and retail markets. 2 82 In Telef6nica, the
company was free to lower wholesale prices and raise retail prices
despite regulatory rules. 283 Although the cost model used by the
regulatory authority to assess the undertaking's wholesale prices was
based on the LRAIC, it was used to define the maximum prices for
wholesale access ex ante, while the assessment of price compatibility
with Article 102 considered ex post historical data. 284
Telefdnica demonstrates that even if there is a national
regulatory decision, the intervention of the Commission in the
regulated prices under the framework of Article 102 does not violate
the rule ne bis in idem, because the competition-related objectives of
the regulation are much more general than its other objectives.2 85 In
addition, the national regulatory authority in Telefdnica never
analyzed whether there was a price squeeze and was not successful in
avoiding such a competition law infringement. 28 6
The European Commission is entitled to establish priorities and
can decide "not to intervene in cases where a sector-specific regime
provided appropriate solutions to competition related problems," 2 87
but engages in a voluntary policy of opening the broadband market
through competition law, and in particular, price squeeze
prohibition. 288 Geradin asserts, however, that the competition
authorities "should defer to the sector-specific regulator" if there is an
effective regulatory remedy to the antitrust conduct, except when the
regulatory authority fails to intervene adequately. 28 9
To conclude, regulatory rules do not exclude the application of
antitrust laws in either the United States or in the European Union.
Practically speaking, when there is already a decision issued by a
regulatory authority, the U.S. antitrust authority will carefully
consider whether the antitrust function has been fully protected by
the previous decision. When there is no regulatory decision, the
undertaking should first seek a review of pricing by the regulatory
authority, as antitrust courts are reluctant to consider price
infringements of antitrust laws. E.U. competition authorities for
their part consider a price squeeze claim to be a priority to open the
telecommunication network to competition and will intervene despite
regulation.

282.
Deutsche Telekom AG, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578, 37.57, para. 105.
283.
Telef6nica, Case COMP/38.784, paras. 125-27.
284.
Id. para. 494.
285.
Id. paras. 676-85.
286.
Id. para. 684.
287.
Geradin & O'Donoghue, supra note 1, at 418.
Telecomunications Overview, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eul
288.
competition/sectors/telecommunica tions/overviewen.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
289.
Geradin, supra note 276, at 1553.
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VI. COMPETITION GOALS
Many different competition goals have been pursued over the
years in the United States and in the European Union. The goals
were balancing conduct, structure, and performance, or protecting
equity over efficiency or the contrary. These objectives have to be
considered in the larger policy frameworks of the European Union's
common market and the United States' economic influence over world
markets. 290 Even if E.U. and U.S. law headed in diverging directions
in the past,29 ' they now converge with the common goal of protecting
consumer welfare. 292
Often used without a precise definition, this notion of consumer
welfare has been a source of confusion. 293 The ultimate purpose of
competition is to benefit consumers through lower prices, better
quality, and more choice. 294 Consumer welfare is protected through
an unfettered competition process that excludes competitors, if at all,
solely through competition on the merits. 2 95 Protection of the
competition process based on the merits means that consumer
interests are protected not only directly, but also indirectly if the
impact on effective competition structure would have a detrimental
impact on consumers. 296 If a dominant undertaking is not competing
on the merits but excluding a rival by other means, consumer welfare
needs to be protected. Therefore, the concern over price squeezing is
about protecting consumers' interests rather than competitors'
interests. 29 7
In the European Union, there is no need to demonstrate that an
abuse of a dominant position (and specifically a price squeeze) has a

See Brodley, supra note 188, at 1046 (discussing the factors to be
290.
considered in allowing cooperation to promote efficiency); Fox, supra note 224, at 982
(contrasting the approaches of the United States and the Common Market in seeking
to protect the interests of consumers and the free flow of goods).
Fox, supra note 224, at 985.
291.
MIRA BURRI NENOVA, EC ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPETITION
292.
LAW 46-49 (2007); Sidak, supra note 121, at 305.
Brodley, supra note 188, at 1032; John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande,
293.
The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 213 (2008); Gregory J. Werden, Competition, Consumer
Welfare & the ShermanAct, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 87, 91 (2008).
294.
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 19; Kirkwood & Lande,
supra note 293, at 192.
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 6; Werden, supra note 293,
295.
at 90, 97.
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case COMP/38.784-Wanadoo
296.
Espaila v. Telef6nica, para. 544; see also Fox, supra note 224, at 1000-01 ("A refusal to
deal by a firm in a monopoly position is impermissible if its natural effect is to lessen
competition and thereby raise prices to consumers or otherwise degrade the
price/service package offered to them.").
See Sidak, supra note 121, at 281 (arguing that careless enforcement of
297.
price squeezing regulations could be detrimental to consumer interests).
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concrete effect because the notion of abuse is an objective concept. 298
It suffices to demonstrate that the abusive conduct is capable of
restricting competition or is likely to restrict competition.2 9 9 "The
identification of likely consumer harm can rely on qualitative and,
where possible and appropriate, quantitative evidence."3 00 Therefore,
it is not necessary to show that foreclosure effects force the rival to
exit the market: "it is sufficient that the rivals are disadvantaged and
consequently led to compete less aggressively," that their ability to
invest and grow is constrained, and that an equally efficient
Nevertheless, the
competitor bears an unsustainable loss.3 01
Commission examined the direct effects of price squeezing and found,
in Deutsche Telekom, that the development of competition in the
German market was "sluggish,"3 0 2 and in Telef6nica, that the
dominant firm prices were high and the broadband penetration rate
was below average in Spain compared to other E.U. nations.30 3
However, the United States requires actual harm to consumers
arising from the price squeeze to justify an intervention in the
competition process, 304 although antitrust law still protects consumer
indirectly.3 0 5 This view reflects a strong preference for competition
over government regulation of market performance. 306 "[N]one of the
U.S. antitrust statutes are regulatory in the sense of authorizing
governmental intervention to fix price or output, control entry or exit,
or determine of the fairness of . .. a bargain." In contrast, Europeans
"tend to be less hostile to government as a regulator, and more
skeptical of private corporations as servants of the public interest."3 0 7
Indeed, one of the biggest concerns in the United States is having

Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. 11-477, 5
298.
C.L.M.R. 9, para 233 (2008).
Telefdnica, Case COMP/38.784, para. 543.
299.
Article 82 EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 19.
300.
Jean-Christian Le Meur, Iratxe Gurpegui & Katja Viertio, Margin Squeeze
301.

in the Spanish Broadband Market: A Rational and Profitable Strategy, COMPETITION
POL. NEWSLETTER (Competition Dir.-Gen. of the European Commission, Brussels,
Belg.), 2007 (No. 3), at 24-25.
302.
Commission Decision of 21 May 2003, Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 35.578,
37.57-Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, paras. 180-83.
303.
Telefdnica, Case COMP/38.784, paras. 602-03.
304.
Erik and Herbert Hovenkamp, Gregory Sidak, and Gregory Werden only
foresee one possibility where price squeezing would harm consumers-when it prevents
a smaller rival from integrating itself into the primary market. See Hovenkamp &
Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 288-89; Sidak, supra note 121, at 305; Werden, supra
note 293, at 96-97. However, such integration would be uneconomical in the context of
the local loop.
See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610305.
11 (1985) (ruling against a company who was "willing to sacrifice short-term benefits
and consumer goodwill").
306.
Fox, supranote 224, at 982.
307.
Id. at 983.
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courts act like regulators.3 0 8 This concern is linked to the belief that
antitrust enforcement undermines consumer interests,3 0 9 and that
price squeeze liability would chill competition.3 1 0
Linkline illustrates this position:3 1 ' the Court rejected the notion
of harm to competition through the creation of entry barriers or the
impairment of nonprice competition or innovation in the downstream
market.3 12 Furthermore, the plaintiffs had not identified any such
harm.31 3
VII. CONCLUSION

U.S. antitrust law and E.U. competition law converge by and
large because they both seek to protect consumer welfare through the
application of law based on sound economic analysis. 314 On this

308.
See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120-21
(2009) ("We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of clear rules in antitrust law.
Courts are ill suited 'to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity,
and other terms of dealing."' (quoting Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004))); Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915
F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[Antitrust courts normally avoid direct price
administration, relying on rules and remedies (such as structural remedies, e.g.,
prohibiting certain vertical mergers) that are easier to administer."); see also, e.g.,
Philip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989) ("No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot
explain or adequately and reasonably supervise."); Brodley, supra note 188, at 1048 ("A
court can impose structural remedies and simple regulatory controls, but is incapable
of effectively supervising ongoing business activities, such as pricing and entry.");
Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 297 ("[T]he most commonly given
objection to judicial recognition of price squeeze claims is an administrative one . . . .");
Sidak, supra note 121, at 294-96, 299 (arguing that courts are inadequate, and thus,
inappropriate regulators of price squeezing by firms).
309.
Fox, supra note 224, at 982; Werden, supranote 293, at 97.
310.
Dennis W. Carlton, Should "Price Squeeze" Be a Recognized Form of
Anticompetitive Conduct, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271, 277 (2008). The example
given to demonstrate possible inefficiencies is not illustrative of a situation where the
to
providing access
a telecommunications firm
price
squeeze concerns
telecommunications service providers and competing with them to offer broadband
services in the retail market. If the integrated firm raises its wholesale price-aiming
at the exclusion of equally efficient rivals-it justifies condemnation under § 2 of the
Sherman Act because a flawed competition process harms consumer interests. If the
integrated firm raises its retail price, it loses the retail market. If it refuses access to
competitors, the situation is identical to Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 611, where the
undertaking would have to give up immediate benefits, thus barring access to the
market.
Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1122.
311.
312.
Town of Concord, 915 F.2d at 23-24.
313.
Hovenkamp & Hovenkamp, supra note 142, at 282.
314.
Compare Consumer Benefits and Harms: How Best to Distinguish
Aggressive, Pro-Consumer Competition from Business Conduct to Attain or Maintain a
Monopoly, 71 Fed. Reg. 17872 (Apr. 7, 2006) (seeking public comments on the best
ways to identify anticompetitive conduct so as to protect consumer welfare), with
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basis, they both condemn a refusal to deal if its aim is
anticompetitive.3 1 5 Price squeezing, however, illustrates the most
acute difference between the competition laws of the United States
and the European Union: the United States fears introducing
regulatory principles through antitrust law while the European
Union maintains a more tolerant perception of state intervention.
Indeed, in Linkline, this reluctance led the Court to overlook the
basic conditions of the application of § 2 of the Sherman Act and to
reject antitrust liability based on a price squeeze. 316 Unfortunately,
the Court missed an opportunity to delineate certain unresolved
aspects of price squeezing. It would have been interesting to read the
Court's position on the market power needed in the relevant
downstream market and the potential leveraging provided by an
essential asset such as the telecommunications network. One regrets
that the Court did not clarify the debate between the proponents and
opponents of the claim by considering, for instance, possible
justifications for the firm's conduct. Perhaps the result would have
been different with a stricter application of the law. The Linkline
case probably did not ask the right question because, in the end, it
offers no answer about monopolization or an attempt to monopolize,
hypothetically, on the downstream market.
Chief Justice Roberts further stated that "institutional concerns
also counsel against the recognition of such claims"31 7 as antitrust
courts cannot and should not be transformed into regulatory agencies.
In the end, the outcome of the case further restricts the already
narrow possibility of raising the pricing aspect of an antitrust claim.
Moreover, the outcome potentially contradicts another of the Chief
Justice's statements that, "for antitrust purposes, there is no reason
to distinguish price and nonprice components of a transaction."3 1 8
European case law, in turn, elaborates on Alcoa. Recently, the
Commission refined its intentions for future intervention when it
clarified that a price squeeze is considered a refusal to deal and

Neelie Kroes, Eur. Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy, Preliminary Thoughts on
Policy Review of Article 82 (Sep. 23, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECHI05/537 (opining that the primary purpose
of Article 82 is to protect competition, not competitors, with the ultimate goal of
protecting consumer welfare).
See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
315.
U.S. 398, 408-09 (2004) (distinguishing between a refusal to deal motivated by
competitive zeal and a refusal to deal motivated by anticompetitive malice); Article 82
EC Guidance, supra note 115, para. 85 (stating that the Commission will prohibit a
refusal to supply if it is not in the long-term best interest of the consumer).
Linkline, 129 S. Ct. at 1122.
316.
Id. at 1120-21.
317.
Id. at 1119.
318.
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adopted LRAIC as a benchmark.3 19 However, using antitrust rules to
actively encourage the spread of high-speed Internet access in the
European Union fosters a political goal, leading to the use of antitrust
litigation for a regulatory purpose. The details and complexity of the
required sector's market information are reflected in the length of the
Telef6nica decision.
Procedural differences between the United State and European
Union partially explain these differing approaches: antitrust
litigation cases are brought in civil courts in the United States, while
European cases follow an administrative procedure. However, price
squeezing as an antitrust claim should probably find its place in a
balance between the approaches employed by the United States and
the European Union.

319.

Article 82 EC Guidance,supra note 115, para. 79.

